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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of
Appeals which has jurisdiction under U.C.A. 78-2a-3(j), as amended.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW,
STANDARD OF REVIEW,
AND PRESERVATION FOR REVIEW
FIRST ISSUE. Whether Defendants and Appellees Lynn Coon and
Luann Coon ("ATV Owners") were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law where they owned the subject all terrain vehicle in a defective and unsafe
condition and failed to take reasonable steps to repair the defect or to keep the
vehicle secured against use and where such failure was a substantial factor in
causing the subject accident.
SECOND ISSUE: Whether Defendant and Appelle Lynn Coon ("Host")
was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law when he obtained
permission to use a family cabin and the ATV stored there with a broken
headlight and failed to lock or disable the ATV to prevent its use by guests after
dark, and where the Host's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the
subject accident.
THIRD ISSUE.

Whether Defendant and Appellee Pine Mountain

Mutual Water Association ("PMMWA") was entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law where it failed to enforce PMMWA rules intended to protect
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order, safety, and prevent the unsafe and unreasonable operation of ATVs by not
providing security patrols or other security services during nighttime hours over
the subject Memorial Day weekend, and where such failure was a substantial
factor in causing the subject accident.
STANDARD OF REVIEW. In Wvcalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780
P2d 821, 116 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 1989 Utah App. LEXIS 145 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) the standard of review for appeals of summary judgment was articulated
as follows:
"Appellate courts scrutinize summary judgments under the same standard
applied by the trial courts, according no particular deference to the trial
court's legal conclusions concerning whether the material facts are in
dispute and, if they are not, what legal result obtains, [citations omitted].
We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party,
and affirm only where it appears there is no genuine dispute as to any
material issues of fact, or where, even according to the facts as contended
by the losing party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." (780 P.2d at 824).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW. The first and second
issues were preserved in the trial court by Plaintiffs October 30, 2000
memorandum opposing motions for summary including the evidence and other
materials cited therein (R. at 429-491), and during oral argument on December
22, 2000. (R. at 1267, T. pp. 1-54).
The third issue was preserved in the trial court by Plaintiffs December 5,
2000 memorandum opposing motions for summary judgment including the
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discovery materials and other evidence cited in or attached to the memorandum.
(R. at 656-766), and during oral argument on December 22, 2000. (R. at 1267,
T. pp. 1-54).
STATEMENT OF THE APPELLANT'S CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE:

Mr. Henshaw ("Injured Person") was

standing in the driveway of his residence in the early morning hours during the
Memorial Day weekend 1999 when he was struck by an ATV. The ATV
Operator was a social guest from a party at a nearby cabin. The ATV had a
broken headlight which impaired the operator's ability to see objects in the road
ahead. The injured person filed suit against the ATV Operator, the ATV
Owners, the owners of the cabin where the ATV was stored and where the party
was being held, the Host throwing the party, and PMMWA which promulgated
and undertook to enforce rules and regulations for the homeowners' safety and
quiet enjoyment of their property.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. ATV Operator filed for and
obtained a discharge in bankruptcy while this case was pending. The cabin
where the party occurred was owned by Truth and Parley Coon. Parley Coon
passed away and claims against Truth Coon as surviving cabin owner were
settled and compromised. ATV Owners, Host, and PMMWA were dismissed on
their motions summary judgment on the basis of no duty. No trial occurred.
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DISPOSITION BELOW. Argument on the summary judgment motions
went forward December 22, 2000. (R. at 1267, T. 1-54). The Trial Court's ruling
and analysis on the motions are set forth in the Minute Entry dated February 14,
2001. (R. at 827, 834, Addendum 1). The Order granting PMMWA's motion for
summary judgment was signed March 1, 2001. (R. at 855-57). The Order
granting the motions for summary judgment of Lynn, Luann, and Eric Coon was
signed March 5, 2001. (R. at 872-74). Following settlement of the claims against
the remaining Defendant Truth Coon, Final Judgment was entered November
20,2003 dismissing the action in its entirety and with prejudice. (R. at 1255-56).
Notice of Appeal was filed November 24, 2003.(R. 1257-58).
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW1
The accident occurred within the Pine Mountain subdivision located about
8 miles east of .Oakley, Utah. (R. at 657; Depo. Henshaw2, pp. 4, 10-11, R. at

The facts are substantially set forth with citation to the supporting
evidence in Plaintiffs October 30, 2000 Memorandum opposing the motions
for summary judgment of Host and ATV Owners (R. at 429) and in Plaintiffs
December 5, 2000 Memorandum opposing the motion for summary judgment
ofPMMWA. (R. at 656)
2

Portions of various depositions are appended to the parties' memoranda.
The following complete deposition transcripts are part of the record and
contained on 3.5" floppy disks: Dallon T. Walters May 4, 2000; Eric Coon May
19, 2000; Lynn Coon, LuAnn Coon, and Truth Coon July 20, 2000; Jerry
DeBry, Ron Probert November 9, 2000; Evan Baker September 19, 2000;
Ronald Taylor, November 28, 2000; R. at Vol. 1).
8

769-71, 747; Depo. Walters, pp. 35-38, R. at 749-750). The injured person was
standing in the driveway of his residence at Lot 603 near the edge of the road
when he was struck by the ATV operated by Dallon Walters, age eighteen years,
traveling at a speed of approximately 35 to 40 mph. (R. at 656-57, Depo.
Henshaw, pp. 4, 18-21, R. at 769-71, 747, Depo. Walters, pp. 4, 39-42, R. at
1003, 1010) The injured person had been working on the plumbing in the
basement of his home for about 30 minutes prior to the accident he heard and
saw an ATV without lights going by fast. He went to bed but still heard the
sound of an ATV driving back and forth so he went outside and stood in his
driveway three to four feet off the edge of the road. The ATV approached and
the injured person estimated the speed of the ATV to be 35 to 40 m.p.h. Just
prior to impact, the injured person was reaching in his pocket for a lighter to
attract the ATV Operator's attention when he was stuck by the ATV and thrown
by the impact an estimated distance of 40 to 50 feet. (R. 439, Depo. Henshaw,
pp. 10-21, R. at 770-71, 747). The speed limit for all wheeled vehicles in the
Pine Mountains Subdivision set by PMMWA was 15 mph. (R. 463)
The lens on the ATV headlight lens was broken so that the headlight was
not functional which made it difficult for the ATV Operator to see because of
the darkness. (Depo. Walters, pp. 39-41, 45-46, R. at 1003, 1010-1011; Depo.
Lynn Coon, pp. 10-11, R. at 727-28). The ATV Operator did not see the injured
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person until the injured person was right in front of the ATV Operator. Mr.
Walters would have applied the brakes had he seen Mr. Henshaw earlier. (Depo.
Walters, pp. 45-46, R. at 1011). On the evening of the accident the Host knew
the ATV headlight was not working. (Depo. Eric Coon, pp. 43-44, R. at 746).
The ATV owners knew that the headlight on the ATV was broken and had been
broken for three years before the accident. (Depo. Lynn Coon, pp. 10-11, R. at
727-28) The ATV was left at the cabin and the owners had simply not fixed the
headlight. (Depo. Lynn Coon, p. 11, R. at 728)
The ATV Operator had been attending a party at a nearby cabin with the
actual or implied permission of the Host who was one of his friends. (R. at 430,
Depo. Walters, pp. 27-30, R. at 586; Depo. Eric Coon p. 18, R. at 981). The
Host had requested and received permission to use the cabin from his
grandmother Truth Coon who owned the cabin and also from his parents
Defendants Lynn and Luanne Coon. (Depo. Eric Coon, pp. 7-9, R. at 980; Depo.
Lynn Coon, pp. 33-34, R. at 731).
The ATV Operator had not been expressly invited, however the Host said
nothing which made the ATV Operator believe he was not welcome to be there.
(Depo. Walters, pp. 26-27, R. at 1006-07). The Host had been acquainted with
the ATV Operator for years prior to the accident. (Depo. Eric Coon, p. 18, R. at
981). They had been on the same football team. (Depo. Walters, pp. 33-34, R. at
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1008).

Approximately 16 people attended the party, including the ATV

Operator and others the Host did not invite directly. The Host did not object to
the presence of any of the party attendees. (Depo. Eric Coon, pp. 26-28, R. at
722-23). The Host never asked any of the people at the party to leave. (Depo.
Eric Coon, p. 50, R. at 987).

The ATV was kept in the basement of the cabin,

and was taken out by one of the guests and used by guests without objection
from the Host. The ATV Operator and others at the party had the actual or
implied permission of Defendant Eric Coon to use the ATV with the broken
headlight. (Depo. Walters, pp. 31-33; R. at 587; Depo. Eric Coon, pp. 26-28,4546, 69, R. at 744-746). At no time that night did the Host tell the ATV Operator
that he could not ride the subject ATV after dark. (Depo. Eric Coon, p. 69, R. at
991; Depo. Walters, pp. 33-34, R. at 1008). The ATV Operator rode the subject
ATV once before the accident while it was still light out, and it appeared to him
that "...everyone was using it..." and that whoever wanted to use the ATV
could do so. The ATV Operator could hear the sound of the ATV being ridden
for quite a while was he was inside the cabin from the time he arrived until after
dark. (Depo. Walters, pp. 31-34, R. at 1008). The Host was aware that the ATV
was not equipped with an on-off switch but no ignition key or other such locking
device to restrict use the ATV. (Depo. Lynn Coon, p. 15-17, R. at 996; Depo.
Eric Coon, pp.63-64, R. at 990).
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The By-Laws of Pine Mountains Mutual Water Company (Depo. Baker,
Exh. 2, R. at 705-07, 674-690) enumerate the following among the specific
powers of the Board of Trustees in Article XI:
".. .(h) establish 'Rules of the Road' for all development roads; (i) provide
regulations for the common public health, welfare, and safety: Refer to
Pine Mountains Rules Appendix 'A' attached, (j) Levy fines which, if not
paid, will become a lien against the real property owned by the person
fined, which shall be levied for the violations of the rules and regulations
of Pine Mountains Mutual Water Company..." (R. at 682-683).
The Amended Pine Mountains Rules (Depo. Baker, Exh. 2, R. at 684-90)
in effect at the time of the accident include the following provisions:
"OWNERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE
RULES. OWNERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR GUESTS AND
EMPLOYEES. ARTICLE XI (J) OF OUR BYLAWS PROVIDES FOR
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES TO IMPOSE PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES...
2. PLEASE DRIVE SLOWLY AND SAFELY. A maximum speed of
15 mph applies to ALL wheeled vehicles on all Pine Mountains property
unless otherwise posted... All rules of the rules must be obeyed. DRIVE
ON THE RIGHT...
4.
ALL RECREATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLES i.e. ATV's
motorcycles, snowmobiles, etc. will only be driven by a person of
qualifying age of eight (8) years or older, properly trained, mentally and
physically capable of handling the machine in a safe and proper manner to
ensure their safety and the safety of others. The vehicle shall be properly
maintained with all safety equipment working properly including lights,
brakes and noise abatement mufflers with spark arresters...
6. ALL VEHICLES will display Pine Mountains decals...All motor
bikes, ATV's and snowmobiles will display the lot owners numbers for
identification...
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23. QUIET TIME is in effect between 10:00 pm and 8:00 am. Please
observe and instruct your families and your employees to do the same...
(emphasis original)." (Depo. Baker, Exh. 2, R. at 705-07, 684 -85, 688)
Ronald Taylor was a member of the Pine Mountain's Board of Trustees in
1999. (Depo. Taylor, pp. 6-7, R. at 735). Security patrols instituted by the
Board in approximately 1992 in response to complaints about people speeding
on the Pine Mountains roads. (Depo. Taylor pp. 8-10, R. at 735-36). The board
identified four high-use weekends including Memorial Day during which private
security personnel would patrol during the daytime to avoid injuries to people in
the subdivision from speeding vehicles.(Depo. Taylor, pp. 11-15, R. at 736-37).
Mr. Taylor understood from conversations with a Deputy Summit County
Sheriff that the County would act upon five or six different types of problems
within the subdivision including murder, drunken and disorderly conduct, theft,
medical emergencies. Mr. Taylor spoke to the board about the types of problems
the Sheriff would act upon and this was published in the subdivision's "Pine
Mountaineer" newsletter three or four weeks after the accident. (Depo. Taylor,
pp. 16-19, R. at 737-38). ) ATV speeding and operation of ATVs without
headlights were not problems the Sheriff would act upon. (Depo. Taylor, pp. 1820, R. at 738). ) ATV speeding was the main concern of the homeowner's
association. (Depo. Taylor, p. 19, R. at 738).
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Evan Baker is and has been a member of the Pine Mountains' Board of
Trustees since 1983. He has served at various times as vice president and
president. (Depo. Baker, pp. 6-7, floppy disk transcript) The Board has the
power to enforce the subdivision rules by fines. (Depo. Baker, pp. 12, R. at
1015). ATV use and traffic in the subdivision has changed during the past five
years. With a younger group of ATV users at Pine Mountains have come more
ATV incidents including accidents, people rolling over, people going through
fences, as well as increased noise and dust. Mr. Baker has increased concerns
about safety. (Depo. Baker, pp. 13-15, R. at 1015-16). One of the functions of
the Board is to enforce compliance with subdivision rules concerning ATV's.
(Depo. Baker, p. 24, R. at 1018). If late at night security provider Mr. DeBry or
someone else on the board were notified that people were racing up and down
subdivision roads on ATV's, that is something the Board would attempt to
address as opposed to going to the Sheriffs Department or law enforcement.
(Depo. Baker, p. 71, R. at 719).
Jerry DeBry provided security services for approximately eight years
before the subject accident including traffic control on a part time basis during
busy weekends when requested by the Pine Mountains' Homeowners'
Association. (Depo. DeBry, pp. 7, 10-12, 15-16, R. at 708-710). He was
compensated by Pine Mountains for this work. (Depo. DeBry, p. 14, R. 710).

14

Mr. Debry wore a forest green uniform on duty with patches identifying him as
a Pine Mountain Security agent. (Depo. DeBry, pp. 9-10, R. at 709). Mr. DeBry
was present at his cabin on the subject Memorial Day weekend beginning Friday
at around 6:00 p.m., but had not been called by the Homeowners' Association to
do security patrol work and did not patrol which surprised him since he had
regularly been called about to patrol on holiday weekends. (Depo. DeBry, pp.
15-16, R. at 710). During the five years before the accident, Mr. Debry had
been concerned about people exceeding the speed limit on ATV's after dark.
(Depo. DeBry pp. 23-25, R. at 711-12, see also diskette transcript). Mr. DeBry
was paid $8.00 to $9.00 per hour to provide security patrol services. (Depo.
DeBry, p.13-14, R. at 710). The September 1, 1999 report to shareholders and
its attached Statement of Receipts and Disbursements for the fiscal years ending
July 31, 1998 and July 31, 1999 show total receipts for those years of
$141,194.00 and $152,373.00 respectively and total disbursements of
$130,028.00 and $175,157.00 respectively.

The line item for security

expenditures in 1998 was $1,925.00 and for 1999 was $1,392.00.(R. at 694-703,
697).
Mr. Debry observed the subject ATV being ridden around the subdivision
prior to the subject accident with a broken headlight. He did not issue a citation
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for the broken headlight because the vehicle was being ridden in the daylight
hours. (Depo. DeBry, pp. 21-23, R. at 712).
Pine Mountains Subdivision property owners, including Plaintiff and
Defendant Truth Coon, paid for security services from their dues as shown in
Pine Mountain's budget. (Deposition of Truth Coon, pp. 10-12, R. 693, Depo.
Exh. 4, R. at 694-703)
The 1997 Holiday Edition of the PMMWA newsletter contained an article
describing how "road rage" had spread to Pine Mountains: "...People race up
and down the canyon, throw open the gates and drive around the subdivision
like mad, speeding and driving recklessly..." The article reminded homeowners:
"REMEMBER MEMBERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTIONS OF
THEIR GUESTS AND EMPLOYEES. Please take this serious (sic) as action
will be taken..." (Emphasis original). (Depo. Baker, pp. 41-45, R. at 1019-20;
Depo. Ex. 10, Bates page 25-26, R. at 1598-99) Defendant Truth Coon received
a copy of this particular newsletter. (Depo. Truth Coon, p. 14-16, R. at 1025).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
First, the Trial Court erroneously concluded that the ATV Owners owed
no duty to the injured person applying Drvsdale v. Rogers, 869 P.2d 1 (Utah
App. 1994). There, the conclusion that the parents owed no duty toward a
passenger in the son's vehicle negligently operated by their adult son. Here, the
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duty of the ATV Owners arises from the defective condition of their ATV
including both broken headlight and the absence of a locking ignition switch or
other locking device. Evidence presented below showed that the ATV Owners
were aware for a substantial time of the defective conditions of the ATV and
who unreasonably failed to take steps to correct the conditions.

Further,

evidence below showed that nighttime use of the ATV was foreseeable where
the Host had consulted the ATV owners about using the cabin where the ATV
was stored. Evidence below showed the ATV Operator's ability to see objects
ahead of him on the road was impaired by the lack of working headlight which
was a substantial factor in causing the subject accident. Considering these
factors, the appropriate approach to the existence of duty here is a flexible, factbased approach considering the condition of the ATV and the foreseeability of
injury, rather than a rigid approach focusing exclusively upon the nature of the
relationship between injured party and defendant.
Second, the Trial Court erroneously concluded that the Host owed no duty
to the injured person following Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 Utah 23, 997 P.2d
305 (Utah 2000). There, the Utah Supreme Court declined to find a duty owed
by a party host to control a belligerent guest or protect other guests from injury
from the intentional acts of the belligerent guest. Here, the relationship between
Host and ATV gives rise to the duty to lock or disable the ATV from use by
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anyone, at least before darkness falls. During the weekend in question, the Host
was the sole person authorized to use and control the cabin and ATV who was
present. Locking or disabling the ATV would have been inexpensive and
effective and would not require controlling guests. Applying PMMWA safety
rules only homeowners deflates the force and effectiveness of the rules.
Third, the Trial Court concluded that PMM WA was not negligent as a
matter of law for failing to perform security patrols after daylight during the
subject Memorial Day Weekend. From the evidence below, reasonable jurors
could have concluded that a security patrol on duty during the subject weekend
would have observed the party and ATV racing during daylight hours and
corrected it by a courteous warning. Such a jury could also find that the history
of PMMWA's not providing patrols on busy weekends after dark was
unreasonable, especially after the increased concern about ATV use on the part
of Board members. The injured person had a contract based expectation as a
homeowner of security services at least related to use of roads after dark on busy
weekends when his peace and security were most likely to be offended.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE: A duty of care is imposed upon the ATV Owners from the
circumstances including the defective condition of the ATV.
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White v Pinnev, 99 Utah 484, 108 P.2d 249, 1940 Utah LEXIS 76 (Utah
1940) involved an injured caused by a wheel from a hand truck which flew off
defendant's beer truck and injured the plaintiff. Plaintiff unsuccessfully
attempted to establish an inference of negligence through the use of res ipsa
loquitur. Of interest here is the following general statement of the obligations of
owners to maintain vehicles in a safe condition:
"Defendants would not be liable for accident resulting from a defect in the
mechanism of their truck and equipment of which they had no knowledge,
and which would not be revealed by reasonable and prudent inspection.
We quote from 3 Huddy: Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, 9th Ed.,
Section 71:
'Generally speaking, it is the duty of one operating a motor vehicle on the
public highways to see that it is in reasonably good condition and properly
equipped, so that it may be at all times controlled, and not become a
source of danger to its occupants or to other travelers.
T o this end, the owner or operator of a motor vehicle must exercise
reasonable care in the inspection of the machine, and is chargeable with
notice of everything that such inspection would disclose. This rule applies
whether the operator is the owner of the vehicle or rents it from another,
or permits another to use it, or lets it to another for hire. But, in the
absence of anything to show that the appliances were defective, the owner
or driver is not required to inspect them before using the car or permitting
it to be used."5 ( 99 Utah at 492-93)
The Trial Court reasoned away the broken headlight as the basis for duty
by considering that it was unreasonable to expect a party guest would operate
the ATV at night, that it was unreasonable to expect the ATV owners to repair
the headlight in anticipation of the party, that an inoperable headlight is only a
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defect if the ATV is operated at night, and that the PMWWA rules apply only to
homeowners and not to the ATV Owners. (R. at 829).
The Trial Court's logical premise is that an ATV without a headlight is
only defective when operated in the dark. It would follow that a vehicle without
brakes is only defective when the operator wishes to stop or slow, a vehicle
without brake lights is only defective when brought to a sudden stop with a
vehicle close behind, a vehicle without windshield wiper blades is only defective
during periods precipitation, and so forth. Whether the rules of PMMWA alone
create a duty to remedy the broken headlight, the force of ordinary prudence and
due care would require repair of the headlight months or years before the party
in anticipation that someone would need or wish to use the ATV after dark.
Short of repairing the headlight, a reasonable jury could conclude that the
owners should have taken steps to lock or secure the ATV against use by anyone
or directed the Host to do so. Without a keyed locking device, the ATV could
have easily been secured by a lock or by removing the spark plug or other such
steps. The injured person should be allowed his day in court to persuade a jury
of reasonable minds that the broken headlight was a defect which contributed to
the accident and that the ATV Owners were negligent in either failing to repair
the headlight or take steps to ensure the vehicle was locked or disabled. These
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measures do not involve liability for the conduct of the ATV Operator and are
separate acts of negligence.
POINT TWO: A duty of care is imposed upon the Host to secure the ATV
with no working headlight and prevent its after dark use by guests.
Drvsdale v. Rogers, 869 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1994), supra, articulates the
elements required for establishing negligence:
"In order to recover under a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish
that 'the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, defendant breached the duty
(negligence), the breach of the duty was the proximate cause of plaintiffs
injury, and there was in fact injury.' (citation omitted) Thus, Drysdale
must show that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers owed Strong a duty of care, (citation
omitted) A duty of care arises when 'the defendant is under any obligation
for the benefit of a particular plaintiff.' (citation omitted) Absent a
showing of duty or obligation to Strong, Drysdale's claim against Mr. and
Mrs. Rogers cannot succeed, (citation omitted)." (id. at 3).
Cruz v Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 281 Utah Adv.
Rep. 51, 1996 Utah LEXIS 4 (Utah 1996) took up by interlocutory appeal the
denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. The trial court's denial of the motion was affirmed. The
appeal involved the issue of whether a duty was owed by a car dealership to
occupants of a vehicle who were injured in a collision with another vehicle
stolen from the car dealership's lot and driven by the thief who was fleeing from
the police. The Plaintiffs alleged the dealership was negligent for leaving the
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keys in the ignitions of the cars on the lot which facilitated theft. The Utah
Supreme Court wrote:
"Many jurisdictions have held that under 'special' or 'unusual'
circumstances, a duty may exist where a defendant should reasonably
anticipate that its conduct will create an unreasonably enhanced danger to
one in the position of the injured plaintiff. If such danger is foreseeable,
then a duty arises to exercise reasonable care for the safety of others,
[citations omitted] (duty to exercise reasonable care toward safety of
others is essential to physical security and safety of all persons in civilized
society). Each case must be considered on its own facts to determine
whether they result in a foreseeable risk of harm to third persons in the
class of plaintiffs and thus create a duty to refrain from subjecting them to
such risk, [citations omitted]" (909 P.2d at 1255)
After reviewing the factors supporting foreseeability1 of both the theft and
the negligent operation of the vehicle by the thief, including fleeing the police,
the Utah Supreme Court concluded that Defendant may have had owed duty to
Plaintiffs to take adequate precautions to prevent theft of its cars. (909 P.2d at
1256-57).
Here as in Middlekauff the duty rests upon the foundation of need to
prevent access to a motor vehicle. The anonymous car thief in Middlekauff
could have been denied access by the dealer's removing and securing the keys.
The ATV Operator here, together with all other guests at the party, could have

1

"A person's negligence is not superseded by the negligence of another if
the subsequent negligence of another is foreseeable." Williams v Melbv, 699
P.2d 723, 729, 1985 Utah LEXIS 784 (Utah 1985).
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been denied access to the ATV after dark by locking or disabling the ATV. In
Middlekauf, the discussion assumed the vehicles on the lot were in proper
working order. Here the ATV has a defective condition known to the Host
making after dark operation of the ATV dangerous. A person operating the
ATV would be at substantially greater risk for having an accident after dark than
during daylight hours. Where guests at the party were helping themselves to the
use of the ATV without objection from the Host, the Host's assuming that guests
would terminate use of the vehicle at sunset on their own accord is unrealistic
and risky.
POINT THREE: PMMWA owes to the injured homeowner a duty of care
based in contract which encompasses providing security patrols on the
subdivision roads and enforcing both speed limits and safety equipment
rules.
In Martinez v. Woodmar IV Condominiums, 941 P.2d 218 (Ariz. 1997)
the guest of a condominium unit owner attending a graduation party sued the
condominium owners' association after being shot in the condominium complex
parking lot. The plaintiff left the party to check his car in the parking lot and
found a group of local ruffians sitting on the car. A discussion ensued, and
plaintiff fled but was shot in the back while so doing. The perpetrators fled and
were not identified or charged. From plaintiffs description, the condominium's
live-in security officer recognized the group as a gang of young people from a
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neighboring complex who would often gather in the parking lot to sell drugs and
participate in other unsavory activities. The guard would usually disperse the
group when he saw them, but because of budget constraints defendant employed
only one guard who patrolled for eight hours a day in the evening and morning
hours and the incident occurred about an hour before the guard came on duty,
(id. at 219) On motion for summary judgment, the trial court dismissed finding
no duty on the part of the association to prevent the attack. The trial court
analyzed the issue of duty under the rubric of a landlord's duty to protect a
licensee under Restatement (Second) Torts, sec. 315 (1965) which requires a
"special relationship" between the defendant and either the plaintiff or the third
person which imposes a duty to control, (id. at 219) The trial court found
defendant had not assumed a duty to protect plaintiff, (id. at 220) The Arizona
Court of Appeals affirmed. On further appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court en
banc reversed, explaining that although the court of appeals correctly concluded
that no special section 315 relationship existed this did not relieve the defendant
from liability for breach of a duty it may have had as possessor of land with the
right to control activities in the common area where the shooting occurred, (id.
at 220) The supreme court focused on defendant's status with relation to the
parking lot controlled by the association rather than on the presence or absence
of a special relationship with the plaintiff or the tortfeasor, (id. at 220-221). The
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supreme court relied in part on Restatement (Second) Property sections 17.3 and
344 which extend the duty of a condominium association to discover and afford
protection from dangerous conditions or activities on land to not only to unit
owners and their tenants, but also to those who are on the land with their
consent, (id. at 220-222). The supreme court found a duty existed, clarifying
that the question of duty was separate from the question of the breach, i.e.
foreseeability of conduct and the reasonableness of precautions required to
prevent injury, (id. at 223).
In Scott v. Watson, 359 A.2d 548 (Md. App. 1976) a tenant was shot and
killed in an apartment complex garage. On receiving certification of questions of
law from the United States District Court, the Maryland Court of Appeals held
that the landlord owed a duty to use reasonable care to keep the premises safe
and that the duty extended to injuries suffered by tenants as the result of criminal
acts in common areas within the landlord's control. Discussing the landlord's
undertaking to provide security by measures which included providing a private
security guard, the court of appeals wrote: "We think it clear that even if no duty
existed to employ the particular level of security measures provided by the
defendants, improper performance of such a voluntary act could in particular
circumstances constitute a breach of duty. (id. at 555).
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In Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 796 P.2d 506 (Idaho 1990), a worker was
raped in an office building and sued the building owner and the security
contractor. The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment against the
plaintiff which was reversed on appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court. The
supreme court noted the Idaho rule concerning the duties of landlords adopted in
Stephens v. Stearns, 678 P.2d 41 (Idaho 1984) which followed the modern trend
to define the duty simply as reasonable care under the circumstances and to
move away from the strict historical common law rules and exceptions
predicated on the relationship between landlord and tenant. (796 P.2d at 509,
678 P.2d at 49-50). The supreme court rejected the notion that prior injuries
were a necessary predicate to duty or foreseeability, observing that "[t]he solid
and growing national trend has been toward the rejection of the 'prior similar
incidents' rule, [citations omitted]" (id. at 510). The court also noted the
circumstances of the case which were that the landlord had assumed a duty to
provide security. "In addition to the clear rule of Stephens, other legal principles
favor recognition of a requirement of due care in the circumstances present here.
One is the familiar proposition that one who voluntarily assumes a duty also
assumes the obligation of due care in performance of that duty. A landlord,
having voluntarily provided a security system, is potentially liable if the security
system fails as a result of the landlord's negligence, [citations omitted]" (id. at
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509). Rejecting the argument that the defendant's agreement to provide security
was limited to protecting the building and its contents, the supreme court wrote:
"Unfortunately, criminals do not tidily confine their crimes to property only.
Even a shoplifting may turn violent, [citation omitted]... The question is one of
foreseeability. It is therefore an issue for the jury or other trier of fact to decide,
[citation omitted]" (id. at 511).

The court observed that the terms of the

agreement between the security contractor and the owner authorized the
contractor to do all acts the owner could do to protect the premises, and
accordingly the contractor was an agent of the owner and the owner was liable
for the contractor's acts or omissions committed within the scope of the agency,
(id. at 512).
In Turner v. Hi-Country Homeowners Ass'n, 910 P.2d 1223 (Utah 1996)
the owner of a subdivision lot located outside a security gate maintained by the
homeowner's association refused to pay the association's special assessment for
repair of the gate, arguing he should not be charged for services from which he
did not and could not benefit. The association was a non-profit Utah corporation
and its by-laws provided that every owner of a lot within the subdivision shall be
a member of the association and is entitled to vote on association matters, (id. at
1224). The association charged periodic assessments to provide certain services
to owners, including the security gate. (id. at 1224). The Utah Supreme Court
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observed the applicable rule of contract law: "'It is well established precedent
that the bylaws of a corporation, together with the articles of incorporation, the
statute which it was incorporated, and the members application, constitute a
contract between the members and the corporation, [citations omitted]"5 (id. at
1225); See also Workman v. Brighton Properties, Inc., 976 P.2d 1209 (Utah
1999).
In DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983), a clothing
store owner sued a burglar alarm company which installed and maintained a
burglar alarm system on plaintiffs premises in negligence for inventory losses
resulting in a burglary where the perpetrators used a common technique to
defeat the alarm system about which the alarm company was aware. The
contract between the alarm company and the storeowner contained a liquidated
damages provision. The trial court entered summary judgment for the alarm
company and the issue on appeal was whether, assuming negligence on the part
of the alarm company, the liquidated damages provision governed liability in
tort as well as in contract. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, observing that
contractual relationships for the performance of services impose on the parties a
general duty of due care toward the other apart from the specific obligations
contained in the contract. The Court wrote: "A party who breaches his duty of
due care toward another may be found liable to the other in tort, even where the
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relationship giving rise to such a duty originates in a contract between the
parties." (id. at 435).
Turning to the matter at hand, security patrols of Pine Mountain roads on
Memorial Day weekend and other busy are part of the package of services to
homeowners provided by PMMWA and funded by the homeowners. For the
years before the accident, the Board had a budget line item for such services and
a contractor, Mr. Debry, who had provided such services. Mr. Debry was at
Pine Mountains the weekend in question and did not perform security patrol
work because he was not called upon to work that weekend. Security patrols
were affordable. The Board members were aware before the accident of
increased ATV use and speeding. The fact that nighttime security patrols had
not been provided by PMMWA in the past does not preclude a reasonable juror
from finding negligence from failure to provide such patrols during a busy
weekend Memorial Day Weekend. A reasonable jury could determine that a
history of not providing nighttime patrols on busy weekends is a history of
negligence. A reasonable juror could find causation from circumstantial and
direct evidence that PMMWA's conduct of providing security patrol services
during the day and into the night on the subject Memorial Day Weekend would
likely have established an effective, visible presence likely to deter misconduct
including headlight violations and speeding.
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant Larry S. Henshaw respectfully
submits that Appellees were not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law. Appellant requests that summary judgment be reversed and set aside as to
each Appellee, and that the case should be remanded to the trial court for jury
trial and such further proceedings as may be appropriate and consistent with the
foregoing. Further, Henshaw hereby requests an award of costs on appeal in his
favor under U.R.App.P. 34(a) which provides in relevant part:
"Except as otherwise provided by law, ...if a judgment or order is
reversed, costs shall be taxed against the appellee unless otherwise
ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed in part, or is
vacated, costs shall be allowed as ordered by the court..."
Dated this 2,8
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, 2004.

DUNN & DUNN, P.C.
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Attorneys for Appellant Larry S. Henshaw
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